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Most major organizations have mission statements that define their purpose or 
reason for existing. A mission statement is meaningful only if it acts as a unifying 
force for guiding strategic decision making and achieving long term goals. Well 
defined mission statements also serve as a yardstick for measuring organizational 
effectiveness in attaining stated goals. With this is mind, the purpose of this paper 
is to discuss methods that can be used to determine whether the NCAA is achiev-
ing its educational goals or merely using its mission statement as support for an 
“unrelated business.” Differences between Federal Graduation Rates, Graduation 
Success Rates, and the Academic Progress Rate are examined. Implications of 
the NCAA’s statement of purpose for social justice and athletes’ rights are also 
discussed.
Most major organizations have mission statements. A mission statement is 
sometimes referred to as a statement of purpose, a statement of philosophy, or a 
statement of what business one is in. Regardless of the label, mission statements 
provide the foundation for setting priorities, developing strategies, and defining 
organizational goals (Pearce & David, 1987). Most important, mission statements 
specify the fundamental reason why an organization exists. Well defined mission 
statements also serve as a yardstick for measuring organizational effectiveness 
and progress toward attaining stated goals (Hellriegel, Jackson, & Slocum, 2004; 
Robbins & Coulter, 2009).
The NCAA’s basic purpose as stated in the NCAA Manual (2010) is “to main-
tain intercollegiate athletics as an integral part of the educational program and the 
athlete as an integral part of the student body, and by so doing, retain a clear line of 
demarcation between intercollegiate athletics and professional sports,”(p.1). Mission 
statements, if used strategically can serve as an important tool for communicat-
ing an organization’s statement of fundamental values to external constituencies 
(Mission Newsletter, 2010). In the NCAA’s case, these constituencies may include 
powerful organizations like the Federal Government and the Courts. The NCAA 
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for instance, has repeatedly relied on its mission statement to deflect challenges 
from the Internal Revenue Service, and from legal challenges by athletes seeking 
financial and medical benefits that exceed what NCAA rules allow (McCormick 
& MCCormick, 2006; Nagy, 2005; Sobocinski, 2000).
Although the NCAA has been very successful in communicating its educational 
message over the years, the explosive growth revenue-producing sports has led some 
to question the educational value of practices such as the sale of TV broadcasts 
for billions of dollars, regular season football games played on weekday evenings, 
coaches’ salaries in the $4 million range, and the expansion of conferences to 
penetrate new markets. For instance, in 2006 William Thomas, chair of the House 
Committee on Ways and Means, asked NCAA President Myles Brand, to explain 
how the NCAA and its member institutions accomplish their educational mission, 
thereby justifying the college sport industry’s exemption from unrelated business 
income taxes (New York Times, 2006).
As big time college sport takes on more of the trappings of professional sport, 
it will become more important than ever for the NCAA to provide valid and reliable 
measures which can help to answer questions like those posed by Congressman 
Thomas. With this in mind, the purpose of this paper is to discuss methods to 
determine whether the NCAA is achieving its educational goals or merely using 
its mission statement as ideological camouflage for an exploitative business cartel. 
I will also comment on the implications of the NCAA’s mission for athletes’ rights 
and social justice. A major assumption of my address is that maintaining athletes as 
an integral part of the student body entails far more than keeping athletes eligible 
for competition.
Measuring whether College Athletes  
Are an Integral Part of the Student Body
Federal Graduation Rate (FGR)
The Federal Graduation Rate which I will refer to in this paper as the Fed Rate is 
one way to measure whether athletes are an integral part of the student body. The 
Fed Rate is the percentage of students who manage to graduate within six years 
from the school they entered as freshman. The NCAA began to make Fed Rates 
public after the passage of the Student-Right to Know Act and Campus Security 
Act (P.L. 101–542) by Congress in 1990 (Hagedorn, 2004). The Student-Athlete 
Right to Know Act, which was originally introduced by Senators Bill Bradley 
and Edward Kennedy, was passed as “a consumer-information provision” to help 
prospective college athletes and their parents make informed choices about the 
institutions they are considering.
The Fed Rate’s value as a measure of whether college athletes are an integral 
part of the student body derives from its focus on retention. For instance, research 
based on the interactionist model has found that the higher the retention rate, the 
more socially and academically integrated students are likely to be into a col-
lege or university (Nora & Cabrera, 1993; Tinto, 1997). Students who remain at 
the same university until graduation are likely to be those who become engaged 
in academic and campus culture. These students also have an opportunity to 
progress through a curriculum designed to meet that school’s mission. Research 
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also has found that the stronger a student’s affiliation with a college’s milieu—
both in and out of class—the greater the likelihood of retention (Nora, 1993; 
Titus, 2006).
The Fed Rate is especially useful in the athletic context because it allows 
comparisons of athletes with other students on campus. For instance, the Fed Rate 
for the University of Florida’s general student body in 2009 was 80%, meaning 
that 80% of the students that entered Florida as freshmen actually graduated from 
Florida in 6 years.1 The Fed Rate for the football team was 42%, resulting in a 38% 
gap. The Fed Rates at Stanford University in this same period were 95% for the 
general student body and 85% for the players, a difference of only ten percentage 
points (NCAA, 2009). All colleges and universities experience a certain amount 
of attrition. But when athletes are far more likely to drop out or transfer to another 
school than other students, one has to question how well the athletes fit the school’s 
academic profile and mission in the first place.2
The retention rates of athletes are an important measure of how well the 
NCAA is attaining its mission. However, Eckard (2010) has argued that Fed Rate 
comparisons tend to underestimate the graduation rate gap between athletes and 
other students. This, he argues, is because the graduation rates of the general student 
bodies to which athletes are compared are biased downward by the presence of 
part-time students who often take longer than six years to graduate. Boise State, for 
instance, graduated only 27% of its general student body in the 2009 Report, but 
48% of its football players. The percentage of part-time students at Boise State is 
34%, among the highest in the FBS. Eckard argues that if those part-time students 
were full-time, as football players must be to be eligible to play, the Fed Rate for 
the general student body would exceed that of the players. Eckard’s statistical 
adjustment for eliminating the part-time bias (AGG), while provocative, remains 
a rough estimate of the graduation gap.
Graduation Success Rate (GSR)
The National Center for Education and Retention differentiates the terms “persis-
tence” and “retention,” when discussing college graduation rates (Hagedorn, 2004). 
“Persistence” focuses on a student’s success at attaining a college degree, regard-
less of how long it takes or the number of colleges attended. “Retention” focuses 
on a school’s success at transforming freshmen into alumni of their institution. 
According to Hagedorn (2004) “institutions retain and students persist” (p. 6). For 
instance, a college athlete who begins school at one institution, transfers to another, 
and ultimately graduates will count against the retention rate of the first institution 
even though he or she has persisted and graduated elsewhere. While the Fed Rate 
is an excellent measure of retention, it was not meant to measure persistence of 
students who leave for another school and graduate sometime in the future.3
For years, coaches and college athletic officials have complained that the 
Federal Graduation Rate (FGR), as defined by Congress, inaccurately and unfairly 
measures the academic performance of the players on their teams. To address this 
issue the NCAA, in 2005, introduced its own graduation rate which is called the 
Graduation Success Rate (GSR). The assumption of the GSR—and it seems like 
a fair one—is that athletes who leave one university often end up completing their 
degree in another. The GSR methodology excludes from the calculation of gradu-
ation rates those athletes –transfers are an example—who leave school early but 
8  Sack
in good academic standing. The NCAA methodology also includes athletes who 
transfer into an institution in a school’s graduation rate. It seems fair to say that 
the Federal Graduation Rate focuses on retention, while the NCAA Graduation 
Success Rate emphasizes persistence.
The major strength of the Graduation Success Rate is its recognition that 
athletes often take a different path to graduation than other students. The GSR 
will make a major contribution to understanding how athletes are educated when 
it can accurately track all of the athletes who leave in good academic standing. At 
present, the NCAA has no way of knowing the exact number of athletes who leave 
that actually graduate later on. Although the GSR captures a sizable number of 
athletes who transfer in and out, a large percentage is still missing when it comes 
to graduation data (Denhart, Villwock, & Vedder, 2009). In terms of fairness, the 
GSR recognizes the accomplishments of athletes who transfer from one school to 
another and earn a degree. The Fed Rate is a fair measure of how well schools retain 
athletes when compared with other students. Both methods are fair and necessary, 
but measure very different things.
Other Measures of Whether Athletes  
Are an Integral Part of the Student Body
Admission Test Scores and Special Admits
Graduation rates are only one measure of whether the NCAA is achieving its stated 
mission. A critical measure of whether athletes are an integral part to the student 
body is whether they are as well prepared for college level work as other students. 
This is especially important for college athletes in sports that demand a great deal of 
practice and travel time and can leave athletes physically and emotionally exhausted. 
Having roughly the same verbal, reading, and quantitative skills as other students 
would help athletes reconcile the often contradictory demands made on them by 
faculty and coaches (Adler & Adler, 1991; Sack & Staurowsky, 1998). Counseling 
centers can help athletes who are struggling academically, but these centers can 
also isolate athletes from other students on campus, thereby increasing what Adler 
and Adler (1991) refer to as role engulfment.
Investigative reporters have been increasingly successful in gaining access 
to data that sheds light on these issues. The Atlantic Journal Constitution, for 
instance, gathered test score data via public records requests in 2008 on 54 public 
universities that play big-time college sports and found significant gaps between 
big-time college football players and other students in standardized test scores 
(Knobler, 2008). Other journalists have reported data on the disproportionate 
number of “special admits” in big-time college sports schools (Alesia, 2008). 
Although these studies contribute to our understanding of how college athletes 
are educated, they fall short of the rigor needed to qualify as scientific studies, 
largely because these authors often work with woefully inadequate data bases. 
U.S News and World Report publishes such data on entering freshman students 
on a yearly basis. The NCAA should return to its former practice of reporting test 
scores by sport and university. The NCAA should also examine the issue of spe-
cial admits. This kind of transparency would demonstrate NCAA commitment to 
its mission.
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Clustering
Being academically prepared for college is important for academic success, but 
so is athletes’ freedom to choose their own major. Research (Fountain & Finley, 
2009) has found that athletes are more likely to cluster around certain majors then 
are other students. An over-representation of athletes in some courses is not a 
problem if there is a legitimate academic reason for them to do so. Clustering only 
becomes an academic problem if athletes have no choice but to take courses and 
majors to accommodate the demands of their sport. The issue of “gut courses” and 
“friendly faculty” is one that faculty should address. But NCAA research on this 
issue would shed light on how well athletes are integrated into student life. The 
NCAA might also consider coming to the defense of faculty who face ostracism 
for exposing academic fraud.4
Academic Progress Rate (APR)
The NCAA introduced the APR in 2005. The APR is a semester by semester mea-
surement of an athletic team’s academic success. When first enacted, each student 
receiving athletically related financial aid earned one retention point for staying 
in school and one eligibility point for being academically eligible (NCAA, 2010). 
The teams total points earned were divided by points possible. That score was 
then multiplied by 1000, yielding the teams APR. Since 2005, significant changes 
have been made in the calculation. Exceptions are now made for athletes in good 
academic standing who leave early for the pros, athletes who transfer while meeting 
minimum academic requirements, and athletes who return to school at a later date. 
In essence, the APR now gives little emphasis to retention. A question that needs to 
be addressed is whether maintaining athletic eligibility is what the NCAA means 
by “maintaining athletes as an integral part of the student body.”
Retaining a Clear Line of Demarcation  
Between Collegiate and Professional Sport
The prestigious Knight Foundation Commission on College Athletics has stated 
that the look and feel of big-time college sport has become increasingly profes-
sional (Knight Foundation, 2001).5 Stadium expansion that includes skyboxes and 
other luxury seating, licensing deals worth millions, the sale of television rights to 
networks and new media outlets, conferences with their own TV networks, coaches 
with four and five million dollar salaries, conference expansion spurred primarily 
by the prospect of selling college games in more lucrative markets and attracting 
more corporate sponsors: these are just a few of the ways that big-time college 
sport mimics its professional counterparts. It is little wonder that Congressman 
Thomas, Chair of the House Committee on Ways and Means, asked in his 2006 
letter to NCAA President Myles Brand to explain how college sports differs from 
professional sport aside from the former’s tax exemption.
The NCAA’s answer to that question has not changed since the NCAA’s first 
organizational meeting in 1906, even though rules regarding athletically-related 
financial aid have changed dramatically. According to the NCAA, big-time college 
athletes are amateurs engaged in an avocation. “Amateurism,” as former NCAA 
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president Myles Brand correctly asserted, “defines the participants, not the enter-
prise,” meaning that the amount of revenue generated by college sport, even if 
the revenue comes from the same sources as those used by professional leagues 
and franchises, is totally irrelevant when it comes to differentiating amateur and 
professional sports (Brand, 2006). The difference lies with whether the athletic 
participants are paid, and from the NCAA’s perspective athletic scholarships do 
not constitute pay for play.
A very different perspective on the NCAA’s ability to retain a clear line of 
demarcation between collegiate and professional sport comes from scholars and 
reformers who support athlete’s rights. From their perspective, big-time college 
sport made a clean break from amateurism in 1973 when four-year scholarships 
were replaced by one-year scholarships whose renewal can be conditioned on ath-
letic performance and injury (Byers, 1995, Sack & Staurowsky, 1998; Sack 2008; 
Oriard, 2009). According to this argument, one-year renewable scholarships give 
coaches control over the lives of college athletes not unlike the control employers 
have over employees. And the college sport industry has become more of an unre-
lated business of the university than an integral part of the educational program.
The question of whether the NCAA is successfully achieving its mission to 
retain a clear line of demarcation between intercollegiate athletics and professional 
sports is not likely to be resolved by data and empirical research. Rather the answer 
depends on how long the courts will continue to support the NCAA’s claim that 
athletes whose room, board, tuition and fees are conditioned on performance are 
amateurs. This will be a legal and political battle, not one likely to be resolved 
by yet another scholarly study. A Class Action Complaint recently filed in a U.S. 
District Court by a college athlete at Rice University challenges the NCAA’s right 
to limit the period of a scholarship award to one-year (U.S. District Court, 2010). 
Other cases which challenge the NCAA’s right to limit athletes’ financial aid are 
likely to increase in years to come. The Ed O’Bannon versus NCAA licensing case 
is another important example (Thamel, 2010).
Implications for Athletes Rights and Social Justice
There may have been a time when mission statements were perfunctory docu-
ments which managers stored away in a filing cabinet and seldom read. Today such 
statements are often powerful tools for communicating with internal and external 
stakeholders. The NCAA’s statement of purpose expresses educational principles 
that are at the core of American higher education. But even the perception that the 
NCAA is saying one thing and doing another can undermine the organization’s 
legitimacy and make rule enforcement almost impossible. The NCAA’s use of its 
mission statement to mask an unrelated business would constitute blatant exploita-
tion and an assault on social justice.
African Americans comprise a small minority of all students in Football Bowl 
Subdivision Conferences. Yet about 82% of all African American athletes in the 
FBS play football or basketball, the two sports that generate the lion’s share of the 
revenue and have the lowest Fed Rates (Coakley, 2007). Some scholars (Hawkins, 
2010; Edwards, 2000; Harrison, Harrison, & Moore, 2002; Sailes, 1993) have argued 
that many high school and college athletes, especially African Americans—given 
the racial ideology to which they have been exposed—pursue a career in profes-
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sional sports with little regard for developing skills necessary for success in other 
professions. If the NCAA is not meeting its educational mission, such athletes not 
only miss out on crucial academic opportunities but the chance to create financial 
security for their families and themselves while still in college.
It is not enough for an organization to define its mission. It must also evaluate 
whether that mission is being accomplished. Whether the issue is conference expan-
sion, BCS playoffs, coaches’ salaries, race in sport, gender in sport, or disabilities in 
sport, discussions must begin with how these initiatives meet the NCAA’s mission 
and objectives and how successful outcomes will be measured. If the NCAA and 
its member institutions are failing to meet their stated mission, they must either 
develop new strategies or rewrite the mission to fit current realities. If the NCAA is 
accomplishing its mission, total transparency and disclosure of data on how athletes 
are educated could only enhance its standing as the voice of college sports and as 
a strong proponent of social justice.
Notes
1. The 4-class average based on the most recent graduating class and the three previous classes 
was used throughout this paper when referring to the Fed Rate.
2. According to former Notre Dame athletic director, Mike Wadsworth (Delsohn, 1998), there 
was concern at Notre Dame toward the end of Lou Holtz’s years that the Fed Rate for players had 
dropped from about 83% under the previous coach to about 72% under Holtz. “Some players,” 
said Wadsworth, “left for an outstanding professional opportunity…but others left for disciplinary 
reasons, or because they transferred (emphasis mine). Well that does become a concern. Because 
somewhere along the line in our recruiting, we did not get the proper fit for Notre Dame” (p. 344).
3. The Fed Rate, which focuses on retention, allows exclusions for students who leave school to 
enter the armed services, official church missions, foreign service of the federal government, or 
who die or are totally disabled (NCAA, 2007).
4. In 2006, Jim Gundlach, a sociology professor at Auburn, disclosed that significant numbers of 
Auburn football players had enrolled in a sociology class whose professor gave A’s to students who 
attended no classes and did no work. Since then, a crackdown on such practices at Auburn sent 
the football team’s APR plummeting from 4th to 85th in the FBS. Gundlach, who was harassed 
and ostracized as a “whistle blower” has left Auburn (Thamel, 2011).
5. To quote from the Knight Foundation (2001) “Big-time college basketball and football have a 
professional look and feel—in their arenas and stadiums, their luxury boxes and financing, their 
uniforms and coaching staffs, and their marketing and administrative structures. In fact, big-time 
programs have become minor leagues in their own right, increasingly taken into account as part 
of the professional athletics system” (p. 13).
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